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Rule of Law as a Condition or as a Substitute 
for Democracy?
by Richard Balme and Yang Lihua
In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), dynamic policy evolution and related socioeconomic
changes strikingly contrast with the absence of any democratic transition similar to those most
communist countries have undergone during the last two decades. Nevertheless, policy reforms
of the Chinese government entail a number of important administrative and legal develop-
ments, among them a series of amendments to the Constitution. This contribution analyses
whether and how constitutional reforms are to be interpreted as part of the PRC’s modernisa-
tion process. It is shown that the constitutional changes so far have not departed from a tradi-
tional communist approach but have been used to legitimise fundamental policy changes ini-
tiated by the Chinese Communist Party. At the same time, however, this accommodation of the
fundamental law triggered a genuine constitutionalisation process that has been subject to
severe limitations, while also signalling important changes in political culture and imposing
significant tensions on the whole political system. Therefore, recent constitutional developments
in China go far beyond the mere window-dressing that is frequently associated with legal
practices in communist regimes.
In der Volksrepublik China kontrastiert die dynamische Entwicklung der Staatstätigkeit und
ein entsprechender sozioökonomischer Wandel deutlich mit dem Ausbleiben einer demokra-
tischen Transition, wie sie die meisten kommunistischen Staaten während der vergangenen
beiden Jahrzehnte erlebt haben. Gleichwohl zieht die Reformpolitik der chinesischen Regie-
rung einige rechtliche und administrative Entwicklungen nach sich, wozu auch eine Reihe von
Verfassungsänderungen zählen. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, ob und inwiefern diese
Verfassungsreformen als Teil des chinesischen Modernisierungsprozesses zu interpretieren
sind. Es wird gezeigt, dass die bisherigen Verfassungsänderungen nicht von dem traditionellen
kommunistischen Ansatz abwichen, sondern dazu dienten, die substanziellen Veränderungen
der Staatstätigkeit zu legitimieren, die von der Chinesischen Kommunistischen Partei initiiert
wurden. Zugleich jedoch hat diese Anpassung des Grundgesetzes einen genuinen Konstitutio-
nalisierungsprozess ausgelöst, der zwar deutlich begrenzt blieb, aber bedeutsame Veränderun-
gen in der politischen Kultur widerspiegelt und erhebliche Spannungen im gesamten politi-
schen System bewirkt. Von daher gehen die neueren Verfassungsentwicklungen in China ein-
deutig über rein symbolische Maßnahmen hinaus, die häufig mit der Rechtspraxis in kommu-
nistischen Regimen assoziiert werden.
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I. Introduction
This paper reviews constitutional reforms and their implications for the under-
standing of political change in post-Mao China. Three decades after the intro-
duction of the reform policy, what have been the major transformations of the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), what are their consequen-
ces, and what are the contemporary dynamics of Chinese constitutionalism? The
dramatic policy evolution and related economic and social changes in China
strikingly contrast with the limits of political reforms, and particularly with the
absence of any democratic transition similar to those followed by most com-
munist countries in the last two decades. However, the Chinese government’s en-
gagement in its reform policy entails a number of important administrative and
legal aspects as well as widely commented upon amendments to the Constitution.
Understanding whether and how constitutional reform is indeed part of political
modernisation in China is the purpose of this contribution. In particular, we ana-
lyse substantive and procedural aspects of the PRC’s constitutional reforms to ex-
plore their contribution to the development of constitutionalism and the rule of
law in China. By constitutionalism we mean the hierarchy of norms placing the
Constitution in a position of authority above other types of rules, therefore sub-
mitting to the Constitution all government decisions about their compatibility
with the fundamental law. We also use the term “constitutionalisation” to desig-
nate the growing reference to this idea or to the Constitution itself within the
political culture and its effective use in regulating political interactions. By rule of
law, we refer to the recognition, definition and effective implementation by the
state of fundamental rights for citizens, including the right to formally contest
and modify governmental decisions when they violate those rights.
Although the two notions of constitutionalism and rule of law are closely re-
lated, they are nevertheless distinct.1 Indeed, in common law systems the rule of
law can be developed to a great extent on a jurisprudential basis, in some cases in
the absence of a formal constitution (i.e. the “Westminster” model). In other in-
stances, constitutions declaratively acknowledge a number of fundamental rights
without any concrete implications for citizens to formally question the govern-
ment’s policy in the absence of rule-of-law procedures. Constitutional changes
have to therefore be assessed on both dimensions. When China is considered, it is
tempting to interpret the growing legalisation of public policy, including its con-
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1 See in particular Lane, J.-E.: Constitutions and Political Theory, Manchester, , and Holmes, S.: Lineages
of the Rule of Law, in: Maravall, J.M./Przeworski, A. (eds.): Democracy and the Rule of Law, Cambridge,
, –.
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stitutional dimension, as a substitute and possibly an alternative to more sub-
stantial political reforms, namely democratisation. We will first attempt to
identify the different steps of constitutional change and the ideological evolution
they represent for the political regime of the PRC. Secondly, we intend to assess
whether these changes can indeed be interpreted as a constitutionalisation of
Chinese politics, meaning a greater role of the constitution in the conduct of
public policy and a growing submission of governmental policy to constitutional
limitations. Thirdly, we will also analyse whether and, if so, when constitutional
changes entail some progress in the rule of law by which citizens make use of the
constitution to protect their rights against state authorities. Finally, we wish to ex-
plore whether these developments are likely to be conflicting, compatible with, or
alternative to full democratisation in the PRC.
Our argumentation shows that, on the whole, constitutional changes in the
PRC did not depart from a traditional communist approach and also how re-
forms were used to legitimise and to secure fundamental policy changes initiated
by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Furthermore, it argues that accommo-
dating policy change in the fundamental law triggered a genuine constitutional-
isation process, one subject to severe limitations, but nevertheless signalling im-
portant changes in the political culture and imposing significant tensions on the
whole political system. We start with a brief historical review of constitutional
developments in China until the contemporary period before analysing the dif-
ferent reforms introduced since the adoption of the current constitution in .
We then consider in detail the process of constitutional reform and its evolution
and the activism deployed by citizens and groups of legal professionals around
constitutional issues. The conclusion develops the prospective implications of the
trends depicted for the rule of law and democratisation in the PRC.
II. A Brief History of Constitutional Development in China 
since the Qing Dynasty
Constitutional government was properly introduced as a political concept in
China in the late th century by reformists aiming at transforming imperial
institutions to better resist foreign influences and intrusions. The word xianfa,
which is used in Chinese for “constitution”, existed in ancient China, which was
endowed with vivid and burgeoning legal traditions; however the word desig-
nated the set of rules and regulations related to government more than a funda-
mental law in a position of hierarchy with regard to other norms. The same word,
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this time referring to the concept of a constitution in the Western sense, was
reintroduced by Chinese intellectuals in exile in Japan during the Meiji era (–
). Constitutionalism was then considered as the instrument needed to limit
or to abolish the arbitrary power of the Manchu Dynasty as well as to encourage
Chinese elites to promote an effective form of government in a period of trouble.
It was also the legal change required for China to alter its status as a self-centred
empire to a nation-state engaged in international relations.2 Remarkably, from
the contemporary perspective we will adopt here, this moment for constitution-
alism coincided with the first wave of “globalisation” and with the economic,
cultural and colonial expansion of industrial powers on a world-wide scale.
In this context, the Qing Dynasty reluctantly considered some changes, first in
 with the Wuxu Reform and then in  with an imperial edict titled “Gener-
al Principles of Constitutional Government” (Qinding Xianfa Dagang) intended
to elaborate a constitution instituting a parliament, the features of which were
mainly borrowed from the German Constitution of  and the Japanese Meiji
Constitution of . Again in  amidst the secession of a number of provinces
in central and southern China, a Charter (Shijiu Xintiao) followed by an organic
law was promulgated, but this failed to save the Emperor from having to abdicate.
China then entered a long period of institutional collapse and permanent turmoil
marked by rivalries among warlords, Japanese invasion, and civil war between the
Guomindang (KMT) and the Communist Party. A number of constitutional pro-
jects were launched during this period, in particular at the provincial level with
the development of a federalist movement. In , the Hunan province adopted
a constitution and was followed by others. Under the influence of Dr. Sun Yat-
Sen, the founder of the KMT and the icon figure of Chinese republicanism, pro-
jects for a national constitution flourished and were adopted in several instances,3
although they failed to meet the political conditions for implementation. The
Constitution of the Republic of China (Zhonghua Minguo Xianfa) promulgated
by the Guomindang government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek on
 January  still serves as the basic law of the present Taiwanese government.
For a number of reasons that cannot be explained here, the collapse of the im-
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2 Xiao-Planes, X.: Constitutions and Constitutionalism: Trying to Build a New Political Order (–
), in: Balme, S./Dowdle, M. (eds.): Constitutionalism and Judicial Power in China, Basingstoke
(forthcoming). A first (French) version of this article has been published in Delmas-Marty, M./Will, P.E.
(eds.): La Chine et la démocratie, Paris, , –.
3 Xiao-Planes (op. cit., , ) numbers twelve constitutions or organic laws that were promulgated
from  to .
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perial regime was followed by a long period in which the edification of a consti-
tutional state in China proved to be impossible.4
With the end of the civil war and the foundation of the PRC on  October ,
the CCP wanted to model China’s institutions under the precepts of Marxism-
Leninism. The  Constitution, inspired by the  Constitution of the Soviet
Union, guaranteed equality before the law, the separation of powers and private
ownership of the means of production. Within a few years, however, this consti-
tution fell into disuse as Mao’s radical economic plans and sweeping political
agendas left no room for legal restrictions on state power. In , following long
years of political turmoil and devastation imposed by the Great Leap Forward
and before the Cultural Revolution ended, the PRC adopted a second, dictatorial
and ineffective, Constitution. Based on this legacy, it abolished most of the legal
protections offered in the  document and proclaimed the need to struggle
against the capitalist elements of society. Three years later, however, the Eleventh
Central Committee of the CCP concluded that official democratic centralism
would necessarily require a certain measure of democracy and drafted the 
Constitution accordingly. Of course, the meaning of “democracy” remained
grounded in the “people’s democratic dictatorship” (renmin minzhu zhuanzheng
zhidu), based on an alliance of the proletariat classes and led by the Communist
Party. The  Constitution was also an attempt to counteract the personality
cult, the anarchy and the bloodshed of the preceding decade by superimposing a
form of socialist democracy on the existing authoritarian model of government.
Departing from its predecessors, the  Constitution may be viewed as an
expression of Deng Xiaoping’s determination to lay a lasting institutional founda-
tion for China’s economic modernisation. Progressive in many respects, the cur-
rent constitutional document de-emphasises class struggle, omits all direct refer-
ences to the Cultural Revolution, clarifies citizens’ “fundamental rights and
duties” and stresses the importance of socialist law for the regulation of political
behaviour.5 Critics of the constitutional developments in today’s China mainly
address the subordination of the PRC Constitution to the constitution of the
CCP.6 In particular, from a comparative perspective, the absence of judicial or
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4 Mao, S.L.: Recent Development of Constitutional Government in China. Paper presented at the Inter-
national Conference on “The Value Base of Institutions in Times of Political Change”, Taipei, July .
5 Blanchard, H.: Constitutional Revisionism in the PRC: “Seeking Truth from Facts”, in: Florida Journal
of International Law, / (), –, here –.
6 The role of the CCP is acknowledged in the Preamble of the  Constitution: “Under the leadership
of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong’s Thought,
Deng Xiaoping’s Theory and the important thought of ‘Three Represents’, the Chinese people of all
nationalities will continue to adhere to the people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist road.”
The Polit ics of Constitutional Reform in China
Brought to you by | Fondation Nationale Des Sciences Politiq (Fondation Nationale Des Sciences Politiq)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 7/2/12 3:25 PM
constitutional review imposes severe limits on Chinese characteristics of consti-
tutionalism, suggesting that it amounts merely to party politics with a different
name. However, such a position does not allow for considering the possibility of
a gradual change, i.e. slowly developing the rule of law as constitutive of the state
and progressively providing incentives for the government to comply with it.7 The
following section, an analysis of the constitutional amendments introduced since
, will examine whether or not these amendments, beyond enshrining CCP
policy in the state foundations, have contributed to the development of constitu-
tionalism in China.
III. Constitutional Changes and the Reform Policy
Since its enactment in , the Constitution of the PRC has been modified by
four different reforms involving a total of  articles. The distribution of these
articles shows that  of them deal with economic issues to progressively acknow-
ledge market economy,8 eight address the political organisation of state power,9
seven articles involve ideological issues reflecting the policy changes from the
CCP,10 while two refer to social rights and human rights issues (Table ).11
When timing is considered, it is worth noticing the gradual shift from the
economy and related ideological aspects to political organisation and fundamen-
tal rights. It is more accurate to say that rights are latecomers in the constitutional
reform process. In the wording of the Standing Committee of the National
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Art.  further states that “The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state under the people’s demo-
cratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The
socialist system is the basic system of the People’s Republic of China. Disruption of the socialist system
by any organisation or individual is prohibited.”
7 Cai, D. J.: The Development of Constitutionalism in the Transition of Chinese Society, in: Columbia
Journal of Asian Law, / (), –.
8 Articles , , , , , , , , , , , ,  and  of constitutional amendments.
9 Articles , , , , , ,  and  of constitutional amendments deal with the division of powers
between public authorities, elections, and national symbols.
10 Articles , , , , ,  and  mainly concern the Preamble, which asserts the leading status of the
CCP in the PRC’s political system. These amendments are in line with the evolutions of the CCP’s
ideology as reflected by the CCP National Congress, which takes place every five years.
11 Articles  and  of the constitutional amendments passed in  deal with issues of social and
human rights. Art.  indicates for the first time that “the state establishes and improves a social security
system compatible with the level of economic development” (becomes paragraph , Art.  of the
Constitution). Art.  declares, also for the first time, that “the state respects and safeguards human
rights” (becomes paragraph , Art.  of the Constitution).
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People’s Congress (NPCSC) in its Explanation to the Drafting Amendment of the
PRC Constitution, Article , which claims the necessity of establishing a social
security system consistent with the level of economic development, is justified by
the fundamental interests of the masses and as a tool to maintain the social
stability needed to establish a socialist market economy.12 The Explanation also
stipulates that enacting Article , which proclaims the state’s responsibility to
protect human rights, is consistent with the CCP policy defined by its XVth and
XVIth Congresses and aims at promoting international communication and
cooperation with regard to human rights.13
In line with official ideology, Chinese media usually praise constitutional
change as the hallmark of the reform policy:
“The core of the four amendments is to establish a market economy, strengthen de-
mocracy and the rule of law and protect human rights. As the NPC now plays a more
and more important role in promoting political and economic development, it attracts
much attention. Meanwhile, the system reform of the people’s congresses at various
levels has emerged as one of the cornerstones in promoting political civilisation.”14
Academic comments are also positive, albeit in a somewhat more critical tone:
“Our constitution has been revised at the same pace as China’s reform and it has been
called a ‘Constitution of reform’ […] However, it is really time to reconsider the role of
the Constitution and its relationship with reform. The Constitution should be not only
a document acknowledging every big step in China’s grand reform efforts, it should
provide guidance to the overall reform programme itself.”15
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12 Wang, P.Y./Quanguo Renda Chang Weihui Bangongting Mishu Erju [Second Secretarial Office of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress]: Zhongguo Xianfa Wenxian Tongbian [The Ma-
terials of the PRC Constitution], Beijing, , .
13 Ibid.
14 Li, J.G.: All Eyes on NPC, in: Beijing Review,  (. . ), .
15 Xia, Y.: Zhongguo Xianfa gaige de JIge Jiben Lilun Wenti – Cong “Gaige Xianfa Dao Xianzheng Xianfa”
The Polit ics of Constitutional Reform in China
Table : Distribution of Constitutional Amendments (Articles by Topic)
Amendment year/     Total
Topic of articles
Economy     
Political Organisation –  –  
Ideology –    
Rights – – –  
Total     
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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As indicated, the first constitutional reforms considered here reflected the major
change in China’s political economy. On  April , the First Session of the
Seventh NPC’s meeting amended Article , formally endorsing the existence and
development of the private sector as a supplement to the public economy. The
reform was adopted two years after the first draft of the General Principles of the
Civil Law (GPCL), which already contained various provisions on private con-
tract relations. This was the first official recognition of the private sector in
communist China. A related amendment granted permission for the transfer of
land-use rights.16
The  amendment was comprised of two articles loosening the prohibition
of the private economy. The reform echoed the change in ideology of the CCP
during its XIIIth Congress (Zhongguo Gongchandong Zhongyang Weiyuanhui) in
, proclaiming that China would establish an economy relying primarily on
planning, but at the same time allowing market-oriented mechanisms to supple-
ment the former.17
Based upon this declaration, in early  the State Council (the equivalent to
the Chinese government) initiated seven proposals for constitutional amend-
ments. The seven proposed amendments included:
• adding to the Preamble, “China is in the primary stage of socialism” and
“perseveres in reform and opening itself to the outside world”;
• adding “the state permits other ways of distributing wealth” after the para-
graph of Art.  which refers to the principle of “from each according to his
ability” to “each according to his work”;
• revising Art. , which prohibits the lease of state-owned land;
• adding an article concerning the private economy;
• revising Art. , which defines the Chinese economy as primarily centrally
planned but now supplemented by mechanisms of the “socialist market eco-
nomy”;
• stipulating the division of ownership and management for state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs);
• deleting the notion of Rural Peoples’ Communes (nongchun renmin gongshe)
in Art.  of the Constitution.18
452 Balme/Lihua
[The Fundamental Theoretical Issues of China’s Constitutional Reform: From “A Reform Constitution”
to “A Constitutional Government Constitution”], in: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue [The Social Sciences of
China], February , –.
16 Blanchard, H., op. cit.,  f.
17 Wang, P.Y./Quanguo Renda Chang Weihui Bangongting Mishu Erju, op. cit., .
18 See Tian, J.Y.: Shinian Renda Shengya [Ten Years in NPC], in: Xinhua Wenzhai, September .
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Under the  Constitution, the Chinese economy excluded any reference to
the market, this being considered incompatible with historical socialism. As the
major actor implementing reform, the State Council considered the economic
regulatory system as outmoded and not suitable for upcoming economic re-
forms. For the Chinese executive, constitutional changes were necessary to pro-
vide the legal basis to conduct relevant reforms. Some of these amendments were
decisive in legally unleashing policy changes in China, particularly the option to
lease state-owned land, thus introducing the negotiability and marketability of
land-use rights, which is so crucial to urban development. It is interesting to note
that before the  constitutional amendment, some cities had already engaged
in policies leasing state-owned land under the authorisation of the China Land
Administration (Guojia Tudi Guanliju). In , the China Land Administration
had authorised six cities (Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Fuzhou,
Xiamen) and the island of Hainan to lease state-owned land, which had been
prohibited up to then. Obviously, these administrative policies generated
important controversies about their conformity with the Constitution.19 Signifi-
cantly from our perspective, the reform policy preceded constitutional change
that was implemented in a second stage in order to legalise ongoing governmental
practices.
However, the seven proposals from the State Council were too controversial at
that time to be fully accepted within the Politburo, and only two of them were
eventually endorsed by the Central Committee of the CCP.20 One of these pro-
posals concerns the recognition of the private economy, while the other deals
with the permission to transfer the rights to use land.21
On  February , the Central Committee proposed the constitutional
amendment to the Standing Committee of the NPC and recommended that the
ZSE –⁄  453
19 In particular about compatibility with Art. , paragraph , which states that “no organisation or
individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease, or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful
means”. Cf. Zhang X.R./Chen, N.: Ershi Shiji Zhi Zhongguo Xianzheng [The th Century’s Chinese
Constitutionalism], Wuhan, , .
20 Tian, J.Y., op. cit.
21 The amendment reads: “Article . Article  of the Constitution shall include a new paragraph which
reads: ‘The state permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop within the limits
prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is a complement to the socialist public economy.
The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the economy and exercises
guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the economy.’
Article . The fourth paragraph of Article  of the Constitution, which provides that ‘no organisation
or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease land or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by
unlawful means’, shall be amended to ‘no organisation or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or other-
wise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means. The right to the use of land may be transferred
according to law.’”
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latter initiate the legislative process to amend the Constitution.22 The first session
of the VIIth Meeting of the NPC passed the constitutional amendment 23 in the
exact wording proposed by the Central Committee. This amendment was the first
constitutional reform after the adoption of the  Constitution. It was crucial
in abolishing the unconstitutionality of the market economy and in defining a
legal basis for the reform policy.
In its own turn, the  constitutional reform followed the ideological change
promoted by the CCP during its XIVth Congress of . China was then declared
to be in the primary stage of socialism; the nation’s basic task was to concentrate
its effort on socialist modernisation, this in line with the theory of building
socialism with Chinese characteristics (jianshe you zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi).
The aggiornamento also indicated that the basic goal of reform was to establish a
socialist market economy, confirming and allowing for further development of
the private economy.24 In line with established practices, the CCP Central Com-
mittee initiated the constitutional reform process by proposing an amendment of
eight articles to the Standing Committee of the NPC. The proposal aimed mostly
at further legalising the changing political economy in the Constitution.25
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22 Wang, P.Y./Quanguo Renda Chang Weihui Bangongting Mishu Erju, op. cit., .
23 Ibid.
24 Pan, W. J.: Lun Xianfa Xiugai, Xianzheng Zhixu Yu Zhongguo Renquan Fazhan Fangxiang [Constitu-
tional Amendment, Constitutionalism and the Development of Human Rights Protection in China], in:
 Renquan Ruxian Yu Renquan De Fazhi Baozhang Huiyi Lunwenji [Materials of  Conference
of Constitutionalizing and Protecting Human Rights in China], China Academic Journal Electronic
Publishing House (www.cnki.net), , –.
25 The final constitutional amendment adopted at the First Session of the Eighth National People’s
Congress and promulgated for implementation by the Announcement of the National People’s
Congress on  March  reads:
“Article . The last two sentences of the seventh paragraph of the Preamble to the Constitution read:
‘The basic task of the nation in the years to come is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernisation.
Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and
Mao Zedong’s Thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people’s
democratic dictatorship and the socialist road, steadily improve socialist institutions, develop socialist
democracy, improve the socialist legal system, and work hard and self-reliantly to modernise the coun-
try’s industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology step by step to turn China into
a socialist country with a high level of culture and democracy’. This has been revised to read: ‘China is
at the primary stage of socialism. The basic task of the nation is to concentrate its effort on socialist
modernisation in line with the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Under the
leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong’s
Thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people’s democratic
dictatorship and the socialist road, persevere in reform and opening to the outside world, steadily
improve socialist institutions, develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal system, and work
hard and self-reliantly to modernise the country’s industry, agriculture, national defence and science
and technology step by step to turn China into a socialist country that is prosperous, powerful, demo-
cratic and culturally advanced.’
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Before the Central Committee conveys its proposals to the Standing Com-
mittee of the NPC, the draft is normally circulated to various authorities, social
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Article . The following has been added to the end of the tenth paragraph of the Preamble to the
Constitution: ‘The system of the multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by the Com-
munist Party of China will exist and develop for a long time to come.’
Article . Article  of the Constitution reads:
‘The state economy is the sector of socialist economy under ownership by the whole people; it is the
leading force in the national economy. The state ensures the consolidation and growth of the state eco-
nomy’.
This has been revised to read: ‘The state-owned economy, namely, the socialist economy under owner-
ship by the whole people, is the leading force in the national economy. The state ensures the con-
solidation and growth of the state-owned economy.’
Article . The first paragraph of Article  of the Constitution reads:
‘Rural people’s communes, agricultural producers’ cooperatives and other forms of cooperative eco-
nomy, such as producers’, supply and marketing, credit and consumers’ cooperatives, belong to the
sector of socialist economy under collective ownership by the working people. Working people who are
members of rural economic collectives have the right, within the limits prescribed by law, to farm plots
of cropland and hilly land allotted for their private use, engage in household sideline production and
raise privately owned livestock.’
This has been revised to read, ‘In rural areas the responsibility system, the main form of which is
household contract that links remuneration to output, and other forms of cooperative economy, such
as producers’, supply and marketing, credit and consumers’ cooperatives, belong to the sector of
socialist economy under collective ownership by the working people. Working people who are members
of rural economic collectives have the right, within the limits prescribed by law, to farm plots of
cropland and hilly land allotted for their private use, engage in household sideline production and raise
privately owned livestock.’
Article . Article  of the Constitution reads:
‘The state practices planned economy on the basis of socialist public ownership. It ensures the propor-
tionate and coordinated growth of the national economy through overall balancing by economic plann-
ing and the supplementary role of regulation by the market.’
‘Disturbance of the socio-economic order or disruption of the state economic plan by any organisation
or individual is prohibited’.
This is revised to read, ‘The state practices socialist market economy.’
‘The state strengthens economic legislation, improves macro-regulation and control, and prohibits in
accordance with law any organisation or individual from disturbing the socio-economic order.’
Article . Article  of the Constitution reads:
‘State enterprises have decision-making power with regard to operation and management within the
limits prescribed by law, on condition that they submit to unified leadership by the state and fulfil all
their obligations under the state plan. State enterprises practise democratic management through con-
gresses of workers and staff and in other ways in accordance with law.’
This is revised to read, ‘State-owned enterprises have decision-making power with regard to their
operation within the limits prescribed by law. State-owned enterprises practice democratic manage-
ment through congresses of workers and staff and in other ways in accordance with law.’
Article . Article  of the Constitution reads:
‘Collective economic organisations have decision-making power in conducting independent economic
activities, on condition that they accept the guidance of the state plan and abide by the relevant laws.
Collective economic organisations practice democratic management in accordance with law. The entire
body of their workers elects or removes their managerial personnel and decides on major issues
concerning operation and management’, is revised to read, ‘Collective economic organisations have de-
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organisations and experts invited to provide comments. The Central Committee
then releases explanations, particularly regarding the recommendations it has
rejected, in the “official comments to the proposal with regard to partial revision
of the Constitution”, which are attached to the “proposal of the CCP Central
Committee to the Standing Committee of the NPC with respect to the partial
revision of the Constitution”. In drafting of the  amendment, the Central
Committee received a number of significant recommendations, such as to add
the “one country, two system” guiding principle for the Hong Kong handover in
the preamble of the Constitution, to institute a regulatory power for the Central
Military Commission and to establish under Article  a special commission of
constitutional supervision to insure that the Constitution is fully respected.26 The
above recommendations were eventually not accepted by the Central Committee.
In its official comment, it argued that no amendment was needed on these three
specific issues since they could be interpreted as compatible with the current
constitution.27 Remarkably, in doing so, the Central Committee declared it per-
missible to establish a special commission to supervise the execution of the Con-
stitution, opening up potential space within the current framework to establish
an organ for constitutional review.
On  March , a new constitutional amendment was implemented, again
primarily to reflect and legalise changes introduced by economic reform policies.
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cision-making power in conducting independent economic activities, on condition that they abide by
the relevant laws. Collective economic organisations practise democratic management and in accord-
ance with law, elect or remove their managerial personnel and decide on major issues concerning
operation and management.’
Article . The third paragraph of Article  of the Constitution reads:
‘Work is a matter of honour for every citizen who is able to work. All working people in state enterprises
and in urban and rural economic collectives should approach their work as the masters of the country
that they are. The state promotes socialist labour emulation, and commends and rewards model and
advanced workers. The state encourages citizens to take part in voluntary labour.’ This has been revised
to read, ‘Work is a matter of honour for every citizen who is able to work. All working people in state-
owned enterprises and in urban and rural economic collectives should approach their work as the
masters of the country that they are. The state promotes socialist labour emulation, and commends and
rewards model and advanced workers. The state encourages citizens to take part in voluntary labour.’
Article . Article  of the Constitution reads:
‘The term of office of the people’s congresses of provinces, municipalities directly under the central
government and cities divided into districts is five years. The term of office of the people’s congresses
of counties, cities not divided into districts, municipal districts, townships, nationality townships, and
towns is three years’.
This has been revised to read, ‘The term of office of the people’s congresses of provinces, municipalities
directly under the central government, counties, cities and municipal districts is five years. The term of
office of the people’s congresses of townships, nationality townships and towns is three years.’”
26 Wang, P.Y./Quanguo Renda Chang Weihui Bangongting Mishu Erju, op. cit., p. .
27 Ibid.
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The private sector was further advanced from “a complement” to “a major com-
ponent” of the socialist market economy. Public ownership of the means of pro-
duction would remain dominant, but the acknowledgment of “diverse sectors of
the economy” and of the “coexistence of a variety of modes of distribution” testi-
fied to the growing legitimacy of market mechanisms in the constitutional
order.28
However, in subordinating the protection of private property to that of public
property, the  amendment fell short of a full recognition of property rights
understood as the foundations of the market economy enshrined in liberal Wes-
tern constitutions. Although the PRC’s institutions were for a long time com-
mitted to the eradication of the private sector, they nevertheless had to tolerate
the existence of some individual or non-state ownership at the same time. The
Common Principles (gongtong gangling) adopted in  provided some guidance
for accommodating private economic interests. Similarly, the  Constitution
guarantees the “right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses
and other lawful property”. It does not, however, refer to private property as
“sacred and inviolable”, nor does it provide for its protection as one of the
fundamental rights of citizens.29 As a result, although the market economy is
legally recognised as a legitimate instrument of socialist development, it does not
rest on fully-fledged property rights. In a context of intensive economic growth
and urban development, the implications for enterprises and real estate or land
ownership are tremendous. In particular, modernisation in China comes with a
very intensive reallocation of land-use within and around cities, frequently im-
posing the brutal displacement of residents. Naturally, liberal constitutions expli-
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28 In particular, Art.  of the amendment adds the following paragraph to Art.  of the Constitution: “In
the primary stage of socialism, the state upholds the basic economic system under which the public
ownership is dominant and diverse forms of ownership develop side by side and keeps to the distribu-
tion system under which distribution according to work is dominant and diverse modes of distribution
coexist.” Art.  of the amendment stipulates that Art.  of the Constitution, which reads: “The indivi-
dual economy of urban and rural working people, operating within the limits prescribed by law, is a
complement to the socialist public economy. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the
individual economy. The state guides, assists and supervises the individual economy by administrative
control. The state permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop within the limits
prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is a complement to the socialist public sector of
the economy. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the economy, and
exercises guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the economy”, has been revised as
follows: “The non-public sectors of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the
economy, operating within the limits prescribed by law, constitute an important component of the
socialist market economy. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the individual and private
sectors of the economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and control over the individual and private
sectors of the economy.”
29 Blanchard, H., op. cit., .
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citly or implicitly provide for the possibility of expropriation in the public inter-
est. But the absence of the legal inviolability of private property in the Chinese
Constitution and the subordination of private property to public property prac-
tically obliterates the possibility of appealing against government abuses if the
Constitution is assumed to be a justiciable one.
In such a context, the  amendments attracted considerable attention. At
the XVIth Congress held in November , there was further comment on the
tension between retaining the public sector as the mainstay of the economy and
promoting non-public sectors alongside President Jiang Zemin’s report to the
plenary session indicated that the two policies should not be “set against each
other”, but, on the contrary, “unified” in the process of “socialist modernisation”.30
In the same  report, perfecting the legal system to protect “individual private
properties” (siren caichan) and creating an equally competitive environment for
individual and private economic sectors were defined as the state’s priorities.
Consequently, the  amendments to Articles  and  proclaimed that “citi-
zens’ lawful private property is inviolable”, presumably placing the protection of
private property on par with that of public property. The state’s pledge to “protect
the lawful rights and interests of the non-public sectors of the economy” as well
as the “rights of citizens to private property” has been hailed as the beginning of
the end of the system of public ownership. Whereas the preceding draft of Article
 called for the state to “guide, supervise and manage” the private sector, the
revised version required it to take a more active role to “encourage and support”
the development of the private sector. Finally, the commitment to “make com-
pensation for any expropriation or requisition” of real or private property was
also a significant move from mere recognition to a real constitutional protection
of private property in China.
In conjunction with the above, the official recognition of private entrepreneurs
as constituents of the CCP has attracted the most attention. Aware of the role of
entrepreneurs in the development of the Chinese economy and of their growing
social leadership, Jiang Zemin formally admitted the possibility of entrepreneurs’
becoming members of to the CCP in November  by identifying them as
“builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Their new status was sub-
sequently codified in the  amendment to paragraph  of the Preamble,
which seeks to include “the builders of the cause of socialism” in the “patriotic
united front”, a reference to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress
(CPPCC).31
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30 Huang, X.F.: The Path to Clarity: Development of Property Rights in China, in: Columbia Journal of
Asian Law,  (), –.
31 Entrepreneurs’ party membership is by no means unconditional. Many current CCP members are 
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Last but not least, the  amendment had important implications regarding
individual rights. Article  added one paragraph to Article  of the Constitu-
tion, which reads: “The state establishes a social security system compatible with
the level of economic development.” Article  added one paragraph to Article 
of the Constitution, stipulating that “the state respects and preserves human
rights”. The later followed up Article  of the  amendment, modifying Ar-
ticle  of the Constitution to provide that “the People’s Republic of China governs
the country according to law and makes it a socialist country ruled by law”.
In substantive terms, the  amendment significantly differed from previous
reforms with some real progress in the assertion of rights. In sum, however, it
does not come as a surprise that the development of constitutional reform in
China has been mainly policy-driven, with revisions subsequently providing the
institutional framework for implementing policies initiated by the CCP. We will
now turn to the analysis of this reform process in more detail.
IV. Constitutionalism from Above: Governing by Law
Although various participants intervene in the formal constitutional reform
process, the key role rests with the Central Committee of the CCP. According to
Article  of the  Constitution,32 only the Standing Committee of the NPC or
one-fifth of the members of the NPC can propose a constitutional amendment.
However, the wording of Article  reflects only one part of the picture. As seen
in the previous sections, history shows that it is always the Central Committee of
the CCP who initiates the process of constitutional reform and proposes a draft
amendment to the Standing Committee of the NPC. Such a constitutional con-
vention 33 places the Central Committee in an exclusive position of agenda setter,
both reflecting its pivotal power in Chinese politics and establishing its control of
constitutional policy-making.
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either xiahai, former government cadres who have “jumped into the sea” of the private sector and
therefore possess some degree of political power to begin with, or wealthy managers of large companies
who have amassed considerable economic power.
32 Art. , paragraph  stipulates that “Amendments to the Constitution are to be proposed by the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress or by more than one-fifth of the deputies to the National
People’s Congress and adopted by a vote of more than two-thirds of all the deputies to the Congress”.
33 Yin, X.H./Fang, B.G.: Lun Woguo Xianxing ‘Zhengcexing Xiu Xianfa Moshi de Juxianxing [The
Limitations of the Current “Policy-oriented” Model of Constitutional Reform], in: Law Info China, 
(http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=art&Gid=).
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Constitutional reform in the PRC is also closely related, and indeed subordi-
nated, to changes in the Charter of the CCP.34 The  Constitution was adopted
by the NPC after the XIIth Congress of the CCP had amended its own “consti-
tution” in the same year. Each of the , ,  and  constitutional
amendments also followed changes in the constitution of the CCP, which took
place in sequence in , ,  and . The substance of constitutional
reform therefore primarily reflects the shifts in ideology of the CCP. For instance,
when the resolution of the XIVth CCP’s Congress in  declared that China’s
modernisation would be guided by the theory “to construct socialism with Chi-
nese characteristics” (jianshe you zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi), the  consti-
tutional amendment modified the Preamble accordingly. In , the XVth CCP’s
Congress added “Deng Xiaoping’s theory” as one of the Party’s ideological tenets
and declared as its objective adherence to a principle of “rule by law” to develop
socialism in China. Similarly, the  amendment transposed this ideological
change in the Constitution.
The de facto monopoly of constitutional initiatives with the Central Com-
mittee is not, however, exclusive of any consultation process. Amendment pro-
posals are drafted by a commission appointed by the Politburo of the CCP, a body
that seeks advice and comments from four different types of organisations:
• each central ministerial department and commission, including the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA);
• provincial authorities, including People’s Congresses and the CCP’s author-
ities;
• “the eight small democratic parties”35 and other social organisations; and,
finally,
• experts and scholars relevant to the issues involved in the constitutional re-
form.
On the basis of recommendations collected from these authorities and inter-
ests groups, the Commission drafts an initial proposal submitted for review to the
Politburo and to the Central Committee.36 If both approve the draft in principle,
it is then submitted to the above governmental and non-governmental organisa-
tions for further comments. The commission for constitutional amendment then
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34 Ibid.
35 The CCP is indeed not the only lawful political party in China. There are eight other “democratic
parties” with legal status in the PRC. These parties supported the CCP during the civil war of –.
36 According to Art.  of the constitution of the CCP, the Central Committee and the Politburo are the
central authority of the CCP. Normally, the Central Committee is convened only during the annual
meeting. The Politburo is the standing organ elected by the Central Committee and exercises the power
of the Central Committee when the annual meeting of the latter is over.
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revises the proposal before re-submitting it to the Central Committee and to the
Politburo. The latter in turn reviews the proposal before it enters the legislative
process, i.e. when the Politburo submits it to the Standing Committee of the NPC
on behalf of the Central Committee.
Normally, the Standing Committee of the NPC strictly follows the wording
suggested by the Politburo when the proposal is submitted to the NPC annual
meeting in March, the only authority empowered to pass constitutional amend-
ments. However, it is worth noticing that, during the discussion of the proposal
for the  constitutional amendment by the Standing Committee of the NPC,
some modifications of the CCP’s initial version were formulated. The Standing
Committee recommended adding one sentence to paragraph  of the Preamble,
reading “the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation led by
the Communist Party of China will exist and develop for a long time to come”.37
The recommendation was conveyed to the Politburo, which revised its proposal
after internal discussion. This was the first time the Politburo reconsidered its
own proposal of constitutional reform at the initiative of the Chinese legisla-
ture.38 This move was very remarkable. On the one hand, it can be regarded as a
kind of parliamentarisation of Chinese constitutionalism, since it was the first
time that the NPC took an active role in initiating constitutional change. On the
other hand, the wording of the revision, highly praising both the leadership role
of the CCP and the process by which the Politburo still had to approve the modi-
fication, was quite eloquent about the strict submission of constitutional devel-
opments in China to the initiative and control of the CCP.
V. Constitutionalism from Below: Civil and Legal Activism 
for the Rule of Law
As we can see from the above, the constitutionalisation of Chinese politics, de-
spite some dramatic changes in ideology reflected in constitutional amendments,
has been a gradual and limited process. The picture somewhat changes, however,
when constitutionalism is not considered from above, i.e. at the top of the state
apparatus, but from below, i.e. the way citizens or legal activists essentially make
use of existing procedures.
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37 The recommendation eventually became Art.  of the constitutional amendment.
38 Du, Q.Q.: Woguo  Nian Xiuxian Guocheng zhong Cunzai de Nuogan Chengxu Xiaci [Several Pro-
cedural Defects in the Process of  Constitutional Amendment of China], in: Zhongguo Xianfa Shili
Yanjiu I [Research on Constitutional Developments in China I], Beijing, , .
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In the absence of formal provisions for judicial and constitutional review,
desperate citizens helped by active lawyers have invoked a legal procedure recent-
ly established under Article  () of China’s  Law on Legislation (Lifa La).
This provision grants Chinese citizens the right to propose that the Standing
Committee of the NPC review administrative regulations, the rulings of the Su-
preme People’s Court (SPC) and local laws that they deem legally incompatible
with the Constitution.39
In a decision of  August  (the Qi Yulin case), the Chinese Supreme Court,
asked to arbitrate a private litigation (usurpation of access to university), con-
sidered that the violation of a constitutional right (access to education) could
open the way to compensation in the absence of specific legislation. The decision
and its justification attracted numerous comments since this was the first time
that a court indeed referred to the Constitution in making a decision regarding
citizens’ rights.40 Chinese legal commentaries exaggeratedly (and wrongly) refer-
red to the famous Marbury v. Madison decision of  by which jurisprudence
rather than formal changes of the fundamental law opened the way to judicial
review in the US. In the same vein, in  Judge Li Huijuan from Henan province
refused to implement a local regulation in a civil law case on the ground of its
incompatibility with Article  of the same Law on Legislation. Initially suspend-
ed, the judge finally regained her position after a wide mobilisation of the media,
lawyers and legal academics. Again, the affair attracted important controversies
about the constitutional status of the law referred to and about the procedure.
Finally and more tragically, in  the death of the student Sun Zhigang follow-
ing violence during his detention by the police motivated a group of lawyers to
invoke Article  of the Law on Legislation to address the Standing Committee of
the NPC.41 They intended to contest the constitutional basis of a form of ad-
ministrative detention called the “custody and repatriation” regulation under
which Sun Zhigang had been put under arrest, and they called for the establish-
ment of its constitutional review. Before any decision from the NPC had been
taken, the State Council withdrew the corresponding regulations.42 Finally, the
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39 Balme, S.: The Judicialisation of Politics and the Politicisation of the Judiciary in China (–), in:
Global Jurist Frontiers, /, () (available at: http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol/iss/art).
40 Kui, S.: The Beginning of the Era of the Rule of the Constitution? Reinterpreting China’s First Consti-
tutional Case, in: Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, / (), –, here –.
41 Hand, K.: Citizens Engage the Constitution: the Sun Zhigang Incident and Constitutional Review
Proposals in the People’s Republic of China, in: Balme, S./Dowdle, M. (eds.): Constitutionalism and
Judicial Power in China, Basingstoke (forthcoming).
42 Delmas-Marty, M.: La construction d’un Etat de droit en Chine dans le contexte de la mondialisation,
in: Delmas-Marty, M./Will, P. E. (eds.): La Chine et la démocratie, Paris, , –.
I I I .  I N S T I T U T I O N A L  T R A N S F O R M AT I O N
Brought to you by | Fondation Nationale Des Sciences Politiq (Fondation Nationale Des Sciences Politiq)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 7/2/12 3:25 PM
same NPCSC has been put in the position of interpreting the PRC Constitution
by political developments in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR), particularly when amendments to the HKSAR basic law are consider-
ed.43 Ironically enough, the conservative approach of the PRC’s authorities to
democratisation in Hong Kong and its common law system contributes to a mo-
derate constitutionalisation of politics on the mainland. These different develop-
ments are obviously far too limited to be interpreted as a full swing toward con-
stitutional or judicial review. At least they show some juridification of the Con-
stitution, in some instances used by the jurisprudence, and the existence of a vivid
debate among legal activists and academics about judicial review either by a spe-
cific organ of the NPC or through the creation of an independent court.44 In that
respect they represent some significant developments in the Chinese political and
legal culture.
Does this impact on the ordinary life of Chinese citizens through the justici-
ability of the Constitution? It is hardly disputable that Chinese authorities fre-
quently repress legal activists and make use of arbitrary detention. However, this
does not mean that legal recourse is either inexistent or ineffective. Quite the op-
posite, it can be argued that it is today the dominant form of social mobilisation
in China and the major channel for constitutional change in the absence of sig-
nificant political reform. In the course of these struggles, citizens make use of
constitutional arguments to contest public policy and to request a legal basis for
government action. In doing so, they not only shape public policy, but also claim
and actively promote the constitutional foundations of the state. Recent con-
stitutional complaints reviewed by Keith Hand that involved tax and com-
pensation issues as well as challenges to the Property-Rights Law illustrate this
dynamic.45
As indicated above, the NPCSC, not the judiciary, has the power to invalidate
regulations that contradict the Constitution and national law.46 The Legislation
Law provided the first concrete legal mechanism through which citizens could
advance constitutional claims. Citizens have made active use of this mechanism,
submitting more than  requests since  for NPCSC review on a wide range
of issues.
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In July , an annual road fee for car owners attracted public scrutiny after
the Chinese media reported that a car owner who failed to pay the fee had been
charged , yuan in back penalties. Soon afterward, lawyers uncovered an
apparent conflict between administrative regulations that authorise the fee and
two national laws (the Highway Law and the Legislation Law), and they sent a
claim to the NPC Standing Committee challenging the legality of the administra-
tive regulations authorising the road fee. After the Ministry of Transportation
declared it would continue to collect the fees in , another lawyer submitted a
broader proposal to the NPCSC. The Chinese media reported actively on the
issue, something that put significant pressure on the Ministry. As public con-
troversy over the road fee mounted, the government responded. In late November
, Xinhua News Agency published an interview with NPCSC and State Coun-
cil legal officials, confirming they had received several citizen’s proposals and
reviewed them in accordance with legal procedures. They then offered a legal
justification for continuing to levy the fee. Although the interview did not con-
stitute a formal legal ruling on the citizen proposals, it was nonetheless the first
time that the NPCSC had publicly answered and addressed the legal arguments
in a citizen’s proposal submitted under the Legislation Law.
Another case in  was related to the death of three students in a traffic
accident in Chongqing. Pursuant to a  legal interpretation by the Supreme
People’s Court (SPC), many local courts determine compensation partly on the
basis of whether such accident victims hold an urban or rural residence registra-
tion. Relying on this standard, the responsible party provided the families of two
Chongqing students more than twice the compensation it agreed to provide the
family of a third student, who held a rural residence registration. Domestic media
reported widely on the case, resulting in public controversy over the unjust com-
pensation disparity and related calls for amending the SPC interpretation.
In the wake of these proposals, both local and national authorities announced
legal reforms related to the compensation standard. In , local governments in
five provinces and cities adopted reforms to bring compensation for certain mi-
grants into line with that for urban residents. The SPC also began accepting public
suggestions about revising its interpretation. In March , NPC delegates intro-
duced motions calling on the Supreme People’s Court to equalise the standard.
Shortly afterward, SPC Chief Justice Xiao Yang announced that the interpretation
would be revised after the NPC session. This controversy provides a second recent
example of a citizen’s proposal that influenced government policy and reinforced
constitutional norms.
A third case was the constitutional challenge to the passage of the Property-
Rights Law. Originally scheduled for March , the passage of the law was
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delayed after Peking University law professor Gong Xiantian issued an open letter
arguing that the bill contravened Article  of the Constitution, which declares
that state property is inviolable. The appeal generated extensive controversy after
its diffusion via the internet. As the NPCSC prepared to deliberate on a revised
draft in late , the Chinese government launched an extensive campaign to
defend the proposal and its constitutionality. In December of the same year, when
the NPCSC approved the Property-Rights Law for consideration by the full NPC,
it engaged in an active communication campaign, including a public statement by
its chairman, a press conference by senior officials and publication of scholarly
defenses of the law’s constitutionality by state-run media. Again, although the
issue substantially differed in this case, the government had to publicly take
action to justify its policy on constitutional grounds.
These events are only small steps toward an active use of the Constitution by
citizens and its full effectiveness in guiding policy-making. But their significance
in the PRC’s context should not be underestimated. Prior to the fall of , the
NPCSC had not issued a direct public response to any citizen’s proposals filed
under Article  () of the Legislation Law. The fact that China’s government
publicly reacts to its citizens’ legal and constitutional arguments rather than
merely ignoring or suppressing them is notable in itself. But these responses also
introduce precedents and gradually expand a space for constitutional activism
among citizens. Not only do these responses legitimise the idea that legislative
acts must comply with national law and the Constitution; they also acknowledge
the right of citizens to call legal provisions into question on constitutional
grounds and they build public expectations for government responsiveness to
future appeals. Anticipating a flood of similar petitions relating to other griev-
ances, the Legal Work Committee of the Standing Committee has established a
special office to give preliminary scrutiny to such claims.47 A series of complaints
has reportedly been filed with the Standing Committee against various State
Council regulations, particularly by collective groups of Hepatitis B carriers
claiming that civil service regulations unlawfully discriminated against them, by
female civil servants petitioning to invalidate the requirement that women retire
five years earlier than men and by thousands more challenging regulations au-
thorising the demolition of their housing. These complaints have not yet resulted
in a constitutional decision by the Standing Committee, but they help to spur
administrative reforms and give popular support to Chinese constitutionalism.
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VI. Conclusion
Having reviewed constitutional developments in the PRC since the beginning of
the reform era, how can we characterise the position of Chinese constitutionalism
today? Probably the first element to consider is the long-term perspective and the
tumultuous Chinese history we introduced at the beginning of this contribution.
The PRC has now accumulated a -year period of constitutional government, an
unprecedented fact on the Chinese mainland. This can definitely be attributed to
the reform policy launched by Deng Xiaoping and prolonged by the successive
Chinese leaders as the institutional and political foundations of the CCP’s policy.
It resulted in the establishment of a wholly new political regime, one based on a
new constitution for the Chinese state, and in dramatic changes in the political
culture that are hallmarked by the role of the constitution in domestic politics.
This process can be seen as a second foundation of the PRC by the CCP after the
Cultural Revolution, one in which the state once again emanates from the Party.
The rooting of constitutional government in Chinese politics is definitely a signi-
ficant change in the long term.
Having said that, the major issues are whether the reform policy is in any way
conducive to further political change for the PRC and, more precisely, if constitu-
tional reform and constitutional jurisprudence display any signs of political
liberalisation. From this point of view, a number of observations can be derived
from the above developments. Firstly, while the doctrine of the CCP underwent
radical changes regarding economic policy and the status of the market economy
in China, amendments on political issues have been far more limited, if not ab-
sent. It is true that dramatic advances have been made with the recognition of the
rule of law, human rights and property rights in the Constitution, advances that
represent significant political changes. But the acknowledgement of rights hardly
suffices to serve as a guarantee if the Constitution is not justiciable, and reforms
initiated by the Chinese leadership on this issue have been limited to the provi-
sions in the  Law on Legislation we reviewed above.
Secondly, when the process of constitutional amendment is considered, it is
remarkable that, up to now, constitutional reform exclusively follows, proclaims
and adapts to policy changes initiated by the CCP. Broadly speaking and when key
public policies are considered, constitutional change is basically a step in the
policy implementation conducted by the CCP and it illustrates the overall sub-
mission of the state to the Party. Even when the NPCSC took the unusual step of
initiating a change in the amendment suggested by the Central Committee of the
CCP, it was to further assert the leadership role of the Party. Beyond that, it can
be argued that the Constitution largely exerts a lock-in effect on the CCP sup-
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remacy in Chinese politics and therefore fails to truly liberalise the Chinese re-
gime.
Thirdly, it follows that all instances of progress in the rule of law, if they now
can find a legal basis in the Constitution, are more likely to be substantial in the
areas of judicial reform, legal procedures, law codification, the training of the
judiciary and conditions for legal professions than in the Constitution as such.48
This by no means equates to a sudden advent of the rule of law as an unprec-
edented state of affairs in China but, quite on the contrary, to a long-term mo-
dernisation process by which rights are progressively acknowledged and increas-
ingly respected, if not fully guaranteed. Identifying these developments does not
imply that the situation of rights in China is satisfying; rather, it helps to locate
the actual sources of substantial changes.
Finally, if the institutional constitutionalisation of Chinese politics has thus far
remained strictly contained by the CCP leadership, it has also opened a limited
but significant space for constitutional activism by citizens and legal profession-
als, indeed probably the most remarkable political trend of recent years in the
PRC. These events demonstrate the growing importance of constitutional issues
in politics and public opinion, and deserve attention as manifesting a significant
evolution of Chinese political culture. Of course, their political implications
should not be overestimated. It would be premature to interpret the evolutions
described here as the emergence of an institutionalised and independent legal
process for constitutional review. China remains far from establishing such a me-
chanism. Under the current Constitution, judges are not independent of political
authorities, and citizens do not have a legal right to compel a review of their
constitutional claims. Their capacity to influence the government’s decisions is
also dependent on their capacity to attract media coverage to generate public-
opinion pressure; here again, although the flow of information on the internet is
more difficult to control, citizens are confronted with the lack of institutionalised
pluralism of Chinese society. Many obstacles remain in the way of China’s con-
stitutional development, and constitutional activism as we describe it here is
therefore probably more significant in terms of political culture and social mo-
bilisation than in terms of institutional change. It is nevertheless illustrative of a
process through which citizens make use of the Constitution to pressure the
government and in which the constitutionality of public policy is not left to the
exclusive discretion of leadership but also triggers public interactions between
citizen and the state.
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Whether these developments will indeed nourish further political reforms re-
mains an open question. From a Western and liberal perspective, the rule of law
is understood not only as the protection of citizens’ rights by the state but also
against potential abuses by the government. It is therefore quite apparent that
beyond the recognition of these rights in the Constitution, their effective imple-
mentation requires at least some degree of separation of powers, in particular
independence of the judiciary, as well as the freedom for citizens to publicly
express their grievances and to access legal procedures.49 It is doubtful from this
perspective that the rule of law can be fully established without freedom of
expression and association and competitive elections. As was the case in Taiwan
and again in South Korea, robust constitutional enforcement is more likely to
follow and consolidate, rather than force, political reform at the top.50 But China
may also follow a different constitutional trajectory referring to “Asian values”,
and it is obviously trying to do so in adhering to the principle of rule of law while
avoiding substantial political reform. In that case, the Chinese concept of rule of
law would involve traditional citizen-state interaction, rooted in a Confucian
tradition, in which Chinese elites advance moral claims to guide state behaviour
rather than the more adversarial process in which constitutional disputes are re-
solved in liberal constitutional regimes.
The ideological continuity of Chinese leadership with “the people’s democratic
dictatorship” and democratic centralism do not allow for an accomplished polit-
ical transition if we understand this to be a full recognition of pluralism includ-
ing freedom of expression and association, competitive elections and a related
inversion of relations between the state and the CCP’s respective constitutions.
However, this does not preclude some elements of liberalisation within, rather
than by, the regime. The growing references to the Constitution in Chinese poli-
tics, initially under the concept of “rule by law”, progressively establish some
effective elements of “rule of law” by which citizens indeed make use of the Con-
stitution to contest and to limit the government‘s authority and public policy.
Seen from this perspective, the recent constitutional developments in China go
far beyond the mere window-dressing that is frequently associated with legal
practices in communist regimes.
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